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In modern legislative institutions rely on Parliament to oversee government action, particularly through 
select committees (PSCs). PSCs are used in democratic parliaments to achieve good governance and 
hold the ruling government accountable. Nonetheless, the inadequacy of the current structure hinder 
the PSCs from operating effectively and efficiently. Therefore, the main objective of this article is to 
critically analyse the practices of the PSCs in the Parliament of Malaysia during Barisan Nasional from 
2004 – 2012. This article adopts a qualitative approach of parliamentary ethnography through 
analysing documents as instruments in collecting data and library research. This study critically 
assesses the composition, membership and chairperson of the PSCs based on the provisions in the 
Standing Orders and other relevant statutes that govern parliamentary select committees in the 
Parliament. Based on the analysis, the article concluded that the composition of members and 
chairperson of PSCs during Barisan Nasional (2004 -2012) should be revisited and improved for future 
practice. Unlike the standards indicated in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) 
Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures, 2018, the study found several areas that need 
revisiting, including composition, membership and chairperson of PSC. 
 




Introduction   
 
Parliamentary Committees in Malaysia may be classified into three types: 1) standing committee; 2) 
special select committee, 3) special select committee (ad-hoc). Special Select Committee (SSC) is 
defined as a select committee other than the Standing Committees, namely the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), Selection Committee, Standing Orders Committee, House Committee and 
Committee of Privileges (SO 81(1); Md Yusof, 2021; Malaysian Economic Association, 2017). For 
clarity, Standing Committees are permanent committees and remain in existence throughout a 
parliamentary term to consider matters that fall under its thematic purview (Wong Chen, n.d.). 
Standing committees are relatively older than Special Select Committees, as they were established in 
1959.  
 
As for now, there are two types of SSC that had been established in Parliament. The first type of SSC 
refers to the SSC that had been established when needed or on an ad-hoc basis (Wong Chen, n.d.). 
These committees serve for a limited time and cease to exist when they finish the task assigned to 
them and submit a report (Malaysian Economic Association, 2017). The second type of SSC is known 
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as the permanent SSC that is formed to exercise oversight function over the operations of ministries. 
Their composition and authority are very similar to those of standing committees. It was stated that the 
fundamental job of parliamentary committees in the Australian Parliament is to conduct inquiries that 
include fact-finding, examine witnesses, evaluate evidence, and draft conclusions (Elder, 2018).  
 
This article aims to critically review the implementation of the Parliamentary Select Committees (ad-
hoc) in Malaysia's Parliament during the Barisan Nasional (BN) era from 2004 to 2012. This critical 
assessment examines the membership and chairmanship of the PSCs based on regulations set forth in 
the Standing Orders and in other applicable legislation. The analysis is very important to empower 
PSCs as a mechanism of checks and balances in the Parliament of Malaysia. This paper will 





The motivations for this article stem from the lack of research that has arisen as a result of numerous 
critical restrictions in prior works of literature concerning parliamentary select committees in 
Malaysia. Previous studies have indicated that several improvements should be made to ensure 
effective oversight function and transparency. For instance, Faruqi (2020) suggests several ways in 
which Parliament's special select committees should be improved, including the independence of the 
committees. Md Yusof (2020) discusses the parliamentary select committees, including the standing 
committees and the special select committees, during the Pakatan Harapan administration. The study 
by Hassan et al., 2021 looks at a proposal for improvements, including parliamentary committee 
systems. Nevertheless, these studies do not dwell on the Special Select Committees (ad hoc) in the 
Barisan Nasional government. Additionally, Malaysian Economic Association (2017) and Wong 
Chen, n.d.) conduct in-depth analyses on Malaysia's special select committees prior to the formation of 
Pakatan Harapan and proposes a considerable number of reforms to the committee system in the 
Malaysian Parliament. The research, however, places a lesser emphasis on the Special Select 
Committees (ad hoc) during the Barisan Nasional era. 
 
According to the international standards, the CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic 
Legislatures 2018 advise that in terms of select committee organisation, the Parliament's assignment of 
Committee Members to each Committee should reflect the Parliament's political composition. 
Parliament shall create and adhere to a transparent procedure for appointing or electing Committee 
Chairs. All Committee votes and substantive conclusions, as well as the Committee's reasoning, are 
made accessible and timely to the public (CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic 
Legislatures 2018). Additionally, in terms of the committee's oversight functions, the Parliament shall 
have systems in place to acquire information from the Executive branch adequate to enable it to carry 
out its oversight responsibilities in a relevant and timely way. There shall be clear and effective 
mechanisms requiring the Executive to respond promptly to oral and written queries, as well as 
findings and recommendations of Parliamentary Committees (CPA Recommended Benchmarks for 
Democratic Legislatures 2018). To encourage good governance, oversight committees should offer 
minority and opposition parties and independent members the opportunity to conduct meaningful 
oversight of government expenditures. 
 
In the Malaysian context, the membership in the committee, in particular, SSC, consists of 7 members, 
inclusive of the chair (Md Yusof, 2021). The members of the SSC are appointed by the Selection 
Committee, and it was stated under SO 82(1) that the membership should so far as practicable reflect 
the balance of parties within the House. However, the composition of members in these nine SSCs 
shows that there has been a clear breach of SO 82(1) (Balakrishnan, 2021). Under SO 82(1), the 
members of SSC has the power to elect its own chairperson. To ensure a democratic and fair election 
of chairpersons, it was suggested that the practice of the UK should be modelled as prescribed under 
SO 122 B House of Commons (Hassan et al., 2021). Besides, it is an uncommon practice for a 
minister to be given any position in the committee as the SSC should perform its function 
independently without interference from the Executive (Hassan et al., 2021). As argued in Hassan et 
al. (2021), the opposition should be given the opportunity to chair certain committees. For example, 





nine of the ten SSCs were led by a government backbencher, while an opposition MP led only one 
(Wong, 2020). The practice in Legislative Yuan is that multiple conveners take turns chairing weekly 
meetings, implying that the chair of each committee is not held exclusively by the majority party in the 
House (Huang & Sheng, 2020).  
 
With regards to power, the SSCs are allowed to gather evidence pertaining to their inquiries by 
summoning witnesses and request the production of documents and records that are relevant to the 
inquiries (SO 83(2); Md Yusof, 2021). With regard to that, the Parliament has the authority to punish 
any person who refuses to attend or produce documents or paper before the committee under Section 9 
of Houses of Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act. This shows that the SSC has the authority to 
compel any person to any person to appear and request documents and papers to be produced before 
them, which is a potentially powerful tool to increase the government’s accountability (Khoo, 2020). 
However, it was argued that, in practice, there had been limited use of the SSCs to facilitate the 
Parliamentarians in undertaking their functions (Khoo, 2020). In addition, a lot of important bills are 
rarely forwarded to the SSCs for scrutiny (Khoo, 2020; Malaysian Economic Association, 2017). 
According to Faruqi (as cited in Malaysian Economic Association, 2017; Khoo, 2020), approximately 
80 per cent of bills introduced by the Executive is passed without amendment, 15 per cent receive 
minor amendments, and 5 per cent are withdrawn by the Executive.  
 
As a result of the debate above, it is worth emphasising that existing works of literature lack in-depth 
research of parliamentary select committees (ad-hoc) during the Barisan Nasional from 2004-2012. As 
such, this study seeks to address the gaps and inadequacies in previous research by conducting a 
comprehensive examination of the parliamentary select committees during the Barisan Nasional and 





This study employs a qualitative approach of parliamentary ethnography through analysing documents 
as instruments in collecting data. Parliamentary ethnography means the use of ethnography for 
studying Parliament. This method has been used by scholars such as Crewe (2016) to study the UK’s 
House of Commons, particularly the work of a Member of Parliament (MP) in Parliament and their 
respective constituencies between 2004-2012. Similarly, Adiputri (2019) also uses this method to 
study parliamentary institutions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The justification for 
employing parliamentary ethnography in this study is that it provides a well-rounded perspective of 
PSCs. To collect data through parliamentary ethnography, we have conducted interviews with MPs, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international academic experts and parliamentary officers. 
Due to limited references on Special Select Committees (ad-hoc) during Barisan Nasional (2004-
2012), the findings of this research is entirely based on the primary sources, namely Hansard and 
investigation reports presented by the SSCs to the House. 
 
To triangulate the data collected from these interviews, we used document analysis by studying 
primary and secondary textual documents. They provide holistic views and detailed explanations on 
the background of the Parliament and the works of select committees. The primary sources were from 
Malaysian parliamentary statements such as Standing Orders, Hansard and committee reports, while 
secondary sources were selected from various publications such as academic journals and official 





Previously, the Parliament established several special select committees under SO 81 (1) DR to 
encourage open and free debate among the Executive, backbenchers, and opposition. In 2016, 
Parliament proposed in its transformation agenda the formation of nine Special Select Committees and 
three Committees: 1) the Committee for Consideration of Bills, 2) Committee for Allocation of 
Expenditure, and 3) Committee for Meeting Management, which was later rejected by the Cabinet 





(Penyata Jawatankuasa Dewan, Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan Rakyat, DR. 6, 2016). The following are the 
nine Special Select Committees: 
 
i. Committee on Transportation and Cities; 
ii. Committee on Foreign Affairs; 
iii. Committee on Education;  
iv. Committee on Food and Health; 
v. Committee on Energy, Environment and Water; 
vi. Committee on Rural Well Being; 
vii. Committee on Economics; 
viii. Committee on Women Affairs; 
ix. Committee on Integrity. 
 
However, this article focuses on the Special Select Committees (ad-hoc) during Barisan Nasional 
from 2004-2012. The term ‘ad-hoc’ refers to committees that are frequently formed with a very 
specific mandate for a very specific period of time. Every Special Select Committee has its own 
elected members, defined terms of reference and activities. While Standing Order 74 (1) of the Dewan 
Negara permits the establishment of a select committee, the current study focuses on PSCs in the 
Dewan Rakyat. The Special Select Committees are regarded as ad-hoc committees because they were 
established on a temporary basis and for a specific purpose. The SSC (ad-hoc) are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Special Select Committees during Barisan Nasional (2004-2012) 
 
No. Special Select Committee Year formed Period 
1. Special Select Committee on Unity and National Service 2004 Two years 
2. Special Select Committee on reviewing Penal Code and 
Criminal Procedure Code  
2004 Two years 
3.  Special Select Committee on Electoral Reform 2011 Six months 
4. Special Select Committee on the Lynas Advanced 
Materials Plant (LAMP) 
2012 Three months 
 
Special Select Committee on Unity and National Service  
 
On December 14 2004, the Dewan Rakyat approved the establishment of the Special Select Committee 
on Unity and National Service to scrutinise the following: 
 
i. To examine and discuss issues pertaining to national unity and that have relevance and 
impact on national development policies; 
ii. To recommend amendments to the current development policies and propose new 
strategies to strengthen the ties among the people in the country;  
iii. To investigate and scrutinise acts that are relevant to the national unity program like 
Essential (Rukun Tetangga) Regulations 1975, National Service Training Act 2002, and 
discuss the views put forth by the public to propose amendments for the current law; 
iv. To propose recommendations for policy changes and amendments to laws for 
scrutinisation and consideration.  
 
The Special Select Committee had conducted public hearings, site visits and attended lectures carried 
out by relevant agencies. In addition, several issues were raised by the witnesses during the public 
hearing, including those pertaining to the economy, politics and education. As indicated in Table 2, the 
Special Select Committee had eleven members, nine from the government and two from the 
opposition. In addition, a cabinet minister presided over the Committee. However, in the absence of 
the chairman, the members may elect a chairperson from among those present to preside over the 
meeting for the day.  
 





Table 2: Members for Special Select Committee on Unity and National Service 
 
No. Constituency Party Capacity 
1 MP for Kota Marudu (Chairman) BN Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
2 MP for Kuala Pilah BN Government Backbencher 
3 MP for Alor Gajah BN Government Backbencher 
4 MP for Kapit BN Government Backbencher 
5. MP for Kelana Jaya BN Government  Backbencher 
6. MP for Segambut BN Government Backbencher 
7. MP for Subang BN Government Backbencher 
8. MP for Lanang BN Government Backbencher 
9. MP for Tuaran BN Government Backbencher 
10. MP for Batu Gajah DAP Opposition  Backbencher 
11. MP for Kubang Kerian PAS Opposition Backbencher 
 
Source: Laporan Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas Dewan Rakyat mengenai Perpaduan dan Khidmat 
Negara, Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan Rakyat (DR. 1, 2007). 
 
Special Select Committee on reviewing Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code  
 
On May 8 2004, the Special Select Committee on reviewing Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code 
was set up to examine current legislation and propose amendments for the Parliament’s 
consideration. The Special Select Committee consisted of seven members, of which six were from the 
government and just one from the opposition. A cabinet minister chaired the Committee as indicated 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Members for Special Select Committee on reviewing Penal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code 
 
No. Constituency Party Capacity 
1. MP for Kangar (Chairman) BN Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
2. MP for Santubong BN Government Backbencher 
3. MP for Gelang Patah BN Government Backbencher 
4. MP for Penampang BN Government Backbencher 
5. MP for Cameron Highland BN Government Backbencher 
6. MP for Pasir Puteh BN Government Backbencher 
7. MP for Seputeh DAP Opposition Backbencher 
 
Source: Laporan Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas Dewan Rakyat untuk Mengkaji Rang Undang-Undang 
Kanun Keseksaan (Pindaan 2004) dan Rang Undang-Undang Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Pindaan) 
2004, Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan Rakyat (DR. 1, 2004). 
 
Special Select Committee on Electoral Reform  
 
The ‘Bersih 2.0 rally' took place on July 9, 2011, with participants calling for free and fair elections. 
As a result, former Prime Minister Najib Razak announced the formation of a Special Select 
Committee on Electoral Reform to investigate the following issues: 
 
i. The rules and laws pertaining to elections in Malaysia; 
ii. The electoral process; 
iii. To improve the registration of voters’ system; 
iv. To strengthen the Election Commission (EC); 
v. To study alternate systems to hold elections. 
 





During the six months, the Special Select Committee convened 13 times and created five 
subcommittees. The Committee held several meetings and public hearings in various constituencies 
with numerous stakeholders, including Majlis Belia Selangor, Transparent International-Malaysia, 
Putera MIC, etc. The public hearings took place at the Parliament building and in Kota Kinabalu. 
The Special Select Committee had nine members, five from the government, three from the 
opposition, and one independent, as specified in Table 4. It demonstrated that the members were 
chosen using a proportional representation system. The chairman of this Special Select Committee, on 
the other hand, was a cabinet member who formerly chaired the SSC on Unity and National Service, 
namely the MP for Kota Marudu. 
 
Table 4: Members for Special Select Committee on Electoral Reform 
 
No. Constituency Party Capacity 
1 MP for Kota Marudu 
(Chairman) 
BN Minister of  Science, Technology and 
Innovation 
2 MP for Kangar BN Government Backbencher 
3. MP for Alor Gajah BN Government Backbencher 
4. MP for Kapit BN Government Backbencher 
5. MP for Hulu Selangor BN Government Backbencher 
6. MP for Gombak PKR Opposition Backbencher 
7. MP for Rasah DAP Opposition Backbencher 
8. MP for Kuala Krai PAS Opposition Backbencher 
9. MP forWangsa Maju Independent Backbencher 
 
Source: Laporan Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas berhubung dengan Penambahbaikan Proses Pilihan Raya, 
Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan Rakyat (DR. 1, 2012). 
 
The Special Select Committee presented 22 recommendations based on the investigations to enhance 
the electoral process and system. These proposals were included based on feedback from the public 
hearing sessions, committee members' input, a summary of the subcommittee's findings, and 
observations from on-the-job inspections. It was reported that the Special Select Committee received 
recommendations from 106 associations, registered organisations and individuals. Some of the 
recommendations enumerated in the report are as follow:  
 
i. Use indelible ink;  
ii. The Election Commission (EC) be afforded the power to have its own budget and be 
directly responsible to Parliament to ensure that its objectiveness is not questioned; 
iii. A service commission be set up for the EC to appoint its own officers; 
iv. Independent bodies like Mimos Bhd should be established to help clean up the electoral 
roll, and another PSC to monitor the electoral roll; 
v. The Election Commission should allow postal voting. 
 
Special Select Committee on Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) 
 
Concerns were increasing regarding the government's decision to move forward with the LAMP 
project, which involves radioactive material that could potentially endanger the population of Gebeng, 
Pahang. The Dewan Rakyat passed a motion by the Prime Minister's Department to establish a Special 
Select Committee on LAMP on March 20, 2012. As a result, the LAMP Committee was formed to 
examine the following objectives: 
 
i. To examine the safety, health and environmental issues with regards to the LAMP project; 
ii. To investigate the process and award a license if the plant complies with all the applicable 
laws as well as safety standards.  
 





According to reports, the Special Select Committee held a total of six meetings. The Committee held 
three public hearings in Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur to gather information from individuals, interest 
groups, and specialists. In addition, on May 10, 2012, the Committee visited the plant in Gebeng, 
Pahang. 
 
The Special Select Committee comprised a total of six members, of which 5 of the members were 
from the governing party. In addition, a minister served as the Committee's chairman. According to the 
terms of reference in the report, the Committee should have consisted of nine members, with five from 
the government, three from the opposition and one independent. Nevertheless, according to the report, 
the actual memberships of the Committee are as specified in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Members for Special Select Committee on Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) 
 
No. Constituency Party Capacity 
1. MP for Pasir Gudang (Chairman) BN Minister of Higher Education 
2. MP for Kota Belud BN Government Backbencher 
3. MP for Tebrau BN Government Backbencher 
4. MP for Batang Sadong BN Government Backbencher 
5. MP for Simpang Renggam BN Government Backbencher 
6. MP for Kulim-Bandar Baharu Independent Backbencher 
 
Source: Laporan Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas Mengenai Projek Lynas Advanced Materials Plant 
(LAMP), Majlis Mesyuarat Dewan Rakyat, (DR. 3, 2012). 
 
It was reported that the Special Select Committee had awarded a temporary operating license (TOL) as 
the plant had complied with all safety standards and regulations. The Committee listed out 31 
recommendations, including stringent rules for the plant. A few recommendations are as follows: 
 
i. A monitoring committee to be established to continuously oversee the plant's operations; 
ii. An environmental audit to be conducted by a third party registered with the Department of 
Environment every six months when the plant is in operation to ensure that it complies 
with the Environmental Quality Act 1974; 
iii. MITI or MIDA should consider imposing public engagement conditions to companies for 
their projects that involve radioactive substances subject to the RIA requirements endorsed 
by AELB at an early stage;  
iv. RIA to be updated from time to time according to the recommendations of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report; 
v. LAMP should allow the public, stakeholders, NGO, and professional bodies to have access 




According to the Special Select Committee's (ad-hoc) practice, regardless of SO 82(1) DR, the 
Committee's membership should reflect balance; the analysis discovered that the Special Select 
Committee's (ad-hoc) selection of members was not proportionate. For example, the Special Select 
Committee on LAMP was composed of 80 per cent members from the government side and one 
independent member. There were no opposition representatives on this Committee, which is in 
contravention of the CPA's 2018 Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures. 
 
In the Special Select Committee on reviewing Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, only one 
member from the opposition was appointed whereas, in the Special Select Committee on Unity and 
National Service, there were only two opposition MPs from eleven members, which we believe is 
unbalanced and unjustifiable. However, it is worth highlighting that the composition in the Special 
Select Committee on Electoral Reform was fairly balanced in accordance with SO 82 (1) DR, with 
five members from the government, three from the opposition, and one independent member. 






Additionally, it is critical to emphasise that each ad-hoc Committee was chaired by a minister. While 
there was no clear restriction against a minister chairing the Special Select Committee, it is common 
for ministers to abstain from chairing parliamentary committees, and the Committee's work should be 
independent of the Executive. To maintain an impartial decision-making process and openness, 
ministers should not be allocated a role in PSCs, as advocated by Hassan et al. (2021). As a matter of 
fact, the CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures 2018 recommends that the 
parliament design and adopt a transparent process for selecting or electing the Chairs of Committees. 
 
On the technical side of things and the implementation of the methodology in SSC, the Committee 
carried out its mandate in accordance with the terms of reference. In reality, the Committee's 
recommendations were based on evidence gathered through public hearings, site visits, and feedback 
from a wide range of organisations, professionals, and private citizens. The Committee on Electoral 
Reform's decision to designate subcommittees to which it will transfer responsibility is also 
noteworthy in and of itself.  
 
To ensure that there is a gender balance in the SSCs, there were a total of four female MPs appointed 
in the SSCs during Barisan Nasional (2004-2012), with one female MP appointed in the SSC on Unity 
and National Service and in the SSC on the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP), while the 
remaining two MPS were elected in the SSCs on reviewing the Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code, respectively. However, there were no female members of Parliament nominated to 
the Select Committee on Electoral Reform. This demonstrates that women's involvement in SSCs has 
been at a low rate. More female members of Parliament should be appointed to committees in order to 






Transparent and effective PSCs are imperative to warrant an inclusive and sustainable Parliament. It is 
vital that the PSC fulfils its mandate of overseeing policy implementation and holding the executive 
accountable to the public for national development. As a result, both Parliament and parliamentarians 
should carry out their roles in PSCs to ensure the successful implementation of all government plans, 
strategies, and programs. PSCs should provide a safe space for members to discuss and debate policy 
formulation while setting aside their political disagreements. 
 
In conclusion, the parliamentary reform to institutionalise the parliamentary select committees (PSCs) 
in order to strengthen the oversight function in the Malaysian Parliament is praiseworthy. Since the 
PSC system is at its infancy stage, there are some aspects that require improvement to empower the 
current system. It may take years for the SSCs to provide a systematic or comprehensive check on the 
government; however, the Malaysian Parliament is taking the right steps to strengthen the checks and 
balances system and hold the Executive accountable by institutionalising a parliamentary select 
committee (PSC) system. Fundamentally, for PSCs to be effective, political will and government 
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